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I think that the [NLRA] is of vital importance to the United
States. . . . And the reason why I think it is of vital importance is I
believe very strongly in the free enterprise system. . . . The one
issue, though, in modern capitalism: there is no inherent operat-
ing code in there . . . that guarantees that an employer is not
going to treat employees badly. The National Labor Relations Act
at least provides a process for those employees to become in-
volved in discussing their own terms and conditions of employ-
ment. And I think that that is a very good thing because at the end
of the day we don’t want to wake up and live in a United States of
America that looks like late-stage Imperial Rome where you have
a bunch of oligarchic plutocrats on the one hand and serfs on the
other hand and that’s it. Because at that point nobody has any
stake in society and we’re not America anymore.
—Harry I. Johnson, III, Member,
National Labor Relations Board, 2013–20151
* Associate General Counsel, Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ; J.D.
1993 Harvard Law School. The views expressed here are solely those of Mr. Strom and should not
be attributed to SEIU Local 32BJ.
1. Charles A. Shanor et al., A Conversation with Members of the National Labor Relations
Board and the General Counsel, 64 EMORY L.J. 1553, 1576 (2015).
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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Occupy Wall Street movement called attention to the
alarming concentration of wealth in this country. Notably, the outsized in-
fluence of billionaires is one of the few issues where people on the left and
the right find common ground. While the right’s most prominent villains
are George Soros and Tom Steyer, the left’s are the Koch Brothers and to a
lesser extent, Sheldon Adelson. In 2015, the Koch Brothers announced that
the political network they built planned to spend close to $900 million on
the 2016 election campaign.2 Sheldon Adelson, whose fortune is estimated
(by Forbes) at $35.5 billion,3 and his wife, Miriam Adelson, donated at least
$113 million toward Republican congressional campaigns in the 2018
midterm elections.4
We’ve always had rich people in this country, but wealth is far more
concentrated at the top than it was thirty-five years ago. In 1982, it only
took $75 million in wealth to get a place on the Forbes list of 400 wealthi-
est Americans.5 In 2017, it took $2 billion.6 And, inflation alone does not
account for that difference: $75 million in 1982 is the equivalent of $189
million in 2017.7 Using current dollars, in 1982, the combined wealth of the
Forbes 400 was about $231 billion.8  In 2017, the combined wealth of the
400 was $2.68 trillion!9
Similarly, CEOs have always been paid much more than workers, but
the gap between the average worker’s pay and CEO pay has increased ten-
fold over the last forty years.10 In 1978, CEOs at the largest firms were paid
30 times more than the average worker.11 Today, CEOs are paid 300 times
more than the average worker.12
During this same period, the percentage of workers who belong to un-
ions has declined precipitously. In 1979, 24.4 percent of nonagricultural
2. Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par With
Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/us/
politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html.
3. Luisa Kroll & Kerry A. Dolan, The Forbes 400: The Definitive Ranking of the Wealthiest
Americans, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/forbes-400.
4. Emily Kopp, Sheldon Adelson Breaks All Time Spending Records on Midterm Elections,
Surpassing $100M, ROLL CALL (Oct. 22, 2018, 8:59 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/
sheldon-adelson-breaks-all-time-spending-records-on-the-midterm-elections-surpassing-100-
million.
5. Chuck Collins & Josh Hoxie, Billionaire Bonanza: The Forbes 400 and the Rest of Us,
INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. 4 (Nov. 2017), https://inequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/BIL
LIONAIRE-BONANZA-2017-Embargoed.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Lawrence Mischel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Compensation Surged in 2017, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-surged-in-2017/.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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workers were union members. In 2017, that number had dropped to 10.8
percent,13 and, in the private sector, it was only 6.5 percent.14 When union
membership was strong, worker pay would rise when productivity in-
creased. Productivity rose 95.7 percent from 1948 to 1973, and during that
same time, hourly compensation for non-supervisory workers in the private
sector increased by 90.8 percent.15 By contrast, from 1973 to 2017, produc-
tivity increased by 77.0 percent, but hourly compensation for this same
group of workers only increased by 12.4 percent.16
It is hard to imagine how an objective observer could look at the
United States’ economy and draw the conclusion that workers have too
much bargaining power. And yet, the business lobby has somehow con-
vinced the Republican establishment that they need to make it harder for
workers to organize.
There is no obvious, simple explanation for how we reached this state
of affairs. The “Powell Memo,”17 written in 1971 by future Supreme Court
Justice Lewis Powell to the Chairman of the Education Committee of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, offers a starting point. Powell argued that the
free enterprise system was under attack, and in response the Chamber of
Commerce should develop its own staff of scholars, and should fund arti-
cles, books, pamphlets, and paid advertisements “to inform and enlighten
the American people.”18  A web of pro-corporate think tanks have arisen in
the years after the Powell Memo, and perhaps in direct response to the
Memo.19  The Heritage Foundation, which describes itself as “the nation’s
largest, most broadly-supported conservative research and educational insti-
tution,” was founded in 1973.20 The Federalist Society, a self-described
group of “conservatives and libertarians dedicated to reforming the current
13. Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, & Wayne G. Vroman, State Union Density Esti-
mates by State, 1964-2018, UNIONSTATS.com, http://unionstats.gsu.edu/State_Union_Member
ship_Density_1964-2018.xlsx (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
14. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 3. Union Affiliation of Employed
Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news
.release/union2.t03.htm.
15. See The Productivity-Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2018), https:/www.epi.org/pro
ductivity-pay-gap [https://web.archive.org/web/20181111235030/https:/www.epi.org/productivi
ty-pay-gap].
16. See id.
17. The Powell Memo (also known as the Powell Manifesto), RECLAIM DEMOCRACY!, http://
reclaimdemocracy.org/powell_memo_lewis/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
18. Id.
19. See Mark Schmitt, The Legend of the Powell Memo, THE AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 27, 2005),
https://prospect.org/article/legend-powell-memo (arguing “while the Powell Memo had some im-
pact,” it is a mistake to treat it as the blueprint for what he refers to as “the conservative intellec-
tual infrastructure built in the 1970s and 1980s,” while still noting that “some of Powell’s
recommendations do bear an uncanny resemblance to the institutions of the modern right,” and
admitting that other sources give Powell more credit than he does).
20. About Heritage, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/about-heritage/mission (last
visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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legal order,” was founded in 1982.21  The Pacific Legal Foundation, the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Buckeye Institute for Public Policy So-
lutions, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, all founded in the 1970s and
80s, are just some of the other groups that now regularly churn out legal
briefs and other materials in support of a free market agenda.22
But, in the memo that gave birth to this movement, Powell was not
advocating for business to crush unions.23 Rather, Powell noted that the
heads of national labor organizations “have been respected—where it
counts the most—by politicians, on the campus, and among the media,” and
he just wanted the same respect for business leaders.24 Powell ended his
memo with the hopeful observation that in the United States, “most of the
essential freedoms remain,” including both labor unions and collective
bargaining.25
Unfortunately, in the years that followed the “Powell Memo,” as the
Chamber of Commerce and other trade associations and pro-business think
tanks have stepped up their advocacy, the result has been a vicious cycle for
workers and unions: each attack has weakened unions and thus made it
harder for the labor movement to resist further attacks. Moreover, as the
Chamber of Commerce and other trade associations and pro-business think
tanks have stepped up their advocacy, they have also shifted the terms of
the debate so that they no longer even concede that collective bargaining is
an essential element of freedom.
Donald Trump was elected by painting himself as a different kind of
Republican. While a standard-issue Republican like Senator Lamar Alexan-
der, Chairman of the Senate Health, Education & Labor Committee, has
publicly stated that he would abolish the minimum wage,26 during the cam-
paign Trump gave one of his classic salesman answers when asked about
raising minimum wage: “I’m looking at that, I’m very different from most
Republicans. . .You have to have something you can live on. But what I’m
really looking to do is get people great jobs so they make much more
money than that, much more money than the $15.”27
21. Our Background, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/our-background (last visited
Sept. 3, 2019).
22. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018) (each of these four organizations filed an amicus brief).
23. See Andrew Strom, Justice Powell Wouldn’t Recognize the Monster He Created, ON
LABOR (Dec. 13, 2018), https://onlabor.org/justice-powell-wouldnt-recognize-the-monster-he-
created.
24. The Powell Memo, supra note 17.
25. Id.
26. Dave Jamieson, Lamar Alexandar Says Minimum Wage Should be Abolished, HUFFPOST
POLITICS (June 25, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/lamar-alexander-mini
mum-wage_n_3498975.html.
27. Ben Kamisar, In Reversal, Trump Expresses Openness to Raising Minimum Wage, THE
HILL (May 4, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/278778-trump-expresses-open
ness-to-raising-minimum-wage.
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Even after he was elected, Trump continued giving lip service to the
idea that he would depart from traditional Republican economic policies.
Soon after he took office, he declared, “The GOP will be, from now on, the
party also of the American worker.”28 But despite Trump’s rhetoric, since
he has taken office, the Republican Party has continued on its path of pursu-
ing policies that favor management at the expense of workers.
In Congress, in the courts, and at the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” and/or “Board”), employers have aggressively pushed for policies
that tilt the balance of power even further in their direction, and they have
found a willing partner in the Republican Party. As explained below, over
the last few years, Republicans have introduced a series of bills that would
weaken labor laws, the Supreme Court has issued two major anti-worker
decisions; and the NLRB has reversed even modest gains made by workers
during the Obama years.
CONGRESS
The attitude of the Republican leadership in Congress was illuminated
by a tweet sent out by then House Majority Leader Eric Cantor on Labor
Day in 2012: “Today we celebrate those who have taken a risk, worked
hard, built a business and earned their own success.”29 In other words, he
wanted to turn it into Boss’s Day. And while Cantor is gone, Republicans in
Congress today are equally dismissive of workers’ interests, invariably re-
peating the Chamber of Commerce’s talking points right down to the
Chamber’s catch-phrases. For instance, in 2015, Senator Lamar Alexander
co-sponsored a bill that would have overturned the NLRB’s Specialty
Healthcare decision.30 When the bill was introduced, Alexander issued a
statement that could have been, and perhaps was, written by the Chamber
declaring that “the NLRB’s decision to allow micro-unions divides work-
places and makes it harder and more expensive for employers to manage
their workplace and do business.”31
On June 29, 2017, the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce approved three bills that would have made it harder for workers
to organize. The three bills are H.R. 986, the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act
of 2017;32 H.R. 2776, the Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act;33  and
28. President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump at the Conservative Political
Action Conference, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-conservative-political-action-conference/.
29. Eric Cantor (@EricCantor), TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2012, 9:06 AM), https://twitter.com/Eric
Cantor/status/242654833218293760.
30. Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. 934 (2011), enforced sub
nom. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013).
31. Tim Devaney, Senate GOP Tackles Controversial ‘Micro-Unions,’ HILL (Mar. 20, 2015,
1:41 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/labor/236440-senate-gop-tackles-controversial-micro-
unions.
32. H.R. REP. NO. 115-324 (2017).
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H.R. 2775, the Employee Privacy Protection Act.34 Following the vote,
Committee Chairwoman Virginia Foxx issued a press release declaring that
the bills would “restore fairness and balance to federal labor policies.”35
Chairwoman Foxx had previously asserted that organized labor has “sort of
lost its reason for being.”36  As I explain below, these bills do little more
than remove some workers from the protections of the NLRA and make it
harder for workers covered by the NLRA to organize.
The Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act (“TLSA”) would strip the NLRB’s
jurisdiction over any enterprise on tribal land operated by Indian tribes.37
According to the AFL-CIO, the TLSA would affect 600,000 workers.38 The
most significant impact of this bill would be on casinos, which often em-
ploy large numbers of workers who are not Native American, and likewise
cater to customers who are primarily not Native American.39
The so-called “Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act” (WDAF40)
was designed to undo some aspects of a rule adopted by the NLRB.41 In
2014, after receiving extensive public comment on a proposed rule, the
NLRB announced a series of changes to its election case handling proce-
dures.42 The new rules were designed in part to modernize procedures that
had not been updated in decades—for example, since 1966, once an elec-
tion had been scheduled, the Board gave the employer seven calendar days
to compile and submit a list of eligible voters, along with their home ad-
dresses.43 That time frame arose in an era when  someone would need to
type up the list by hand and employers would need to mail the list to the
33. H.R. REP. NO. 115-326 (2017).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 115-325 (2017).
35. Press Release, Comm. on Educ. & Labor Republicans, Committee Approves Three Bills
to Restore Fairness and Balance to Labor Policies (June 29, 2017), https://republicans-edlabor
.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=401818.
36. Robert Iafolla, Virginia Foxx Questions Need for Unions as She Preps to Chair U.S.
House Labor Committee, NORTH STATE JOURNAL (Dec. 6, 2016), https://nsjonline.com/article/
2016/12/virgnia-foxx-questions-need-for-unions-as-she-preps-to-chair-u-s-house-labor-commit
tee/.
37. H.R. REP. NO. 115-324 (2017) (the bill would amend the definition of employers ex-
cluded from the National Labor Relations Act to add an exclusion for “any enterprise or institution
owned and operated by an Indian tribe and located on its Indian lands.”).
38. AFL-CIO Staff, Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act Would Strip Working People of Freedoms,
AFL-CIO (Feb. 14, 2018), https://aflcio.org/2018/2/14/tribal-labor-sovereignty-act-would-strip-
working-people-freedoms.
39. See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(affirming NLRB’s exercise of jurisdiction over tribal casino based in part on finding that “[t]he
casino employs many non-Indians and caters primarily to non-Indians.”).
40. I’ll use the acronym WDAF because I can’t bring myself to continuously use the Orwel-
lian title the Republicans have given their bill.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 115-326 (2017) (The WDAF included a separate provision overturning the
Board’s Specialty Healthcare decision; that portion of the bill is now moot).
42. Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74308 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 101, 102, 103).
43. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966).
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Board.44 The new rule gives the employer two business days to compile and
electronically serve the list.45 The new rule also acknowledges the new
forms of communication that have developed over the last fifty years, and
accordingly, requires the employer to provide additional contact informa-
tion for employees such as telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, if it
has them.46
The Board’s 2014 election rule also attempted to streamline some pro-
cedures and to eliminate certain practices that had evolved without any ap-
parent rationale for their existence. For instance, in Barre-National, Inc.,
the Board had held that an employer was entitled to a pre-election hearing
regarding the eligibility of certain voters even though the Board was not
required to decide eligibility issues prior to an election.47 In issuing the new
election rule, the Board described the result in Barre-National as “not ad-
ministratively rational.”48 The Board explained that “it serves no statutory
or administrative purpose to require the hearing officer to permit pre-elec-
tion litigation of issues that both the regional director and the Board are
entitled to, and often do, defer deciding until after the election and that are
often rendered moot by the election results.”49 The new rule clarified that
parties at a pre-election hearing only have a right to litigate matters that are
relevant to “the existence of a question of representation.”50 The Board ex-
plained that this limitation was necessary because otherwise “the possibility
of using unnecessary litigation to gain strategic advantage existed in every
case.”51 The Board found that “some parties will use the threat of protracted
litigation to extract concessions concerning the election details, such as the
date, time, and type of election, as well as the definition of the unit itself.”52
Another procedural change the Board made in 2014 was to eliminate an
automatic twenty-five day delay in scheduling an election after a Regional
Director’s decision in a contested case.53 The built-in delay was supposed
to give the parties time to file a request for review with the Board, but the
44. See generally Regional Offices, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/
who-we-are/regional-offices (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (the Board had regional offices in major
cities across the country, but some employers would need to drive several hours to hand deliver
the list).
45. 29 C.F.R § 102.67(l) (2019).
46. Id.
47. 316 N.L.R.B. 877, 878 n.9 (1995) (“We also note that our ruling concerns only the enti-
tlement to a preelection hearing, which is a matter distinct from any claim of entitlement to a final
agency decision on any issue raised in such a hearing.”).
48. Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74308, 74385 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101, 102, 103).
49. Id.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a) (2017).
51. Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. at 74318.
52. Id. at 74387.
53. Id. at 74409–10.
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delay served no purpose because the Board was not required to rule on the
request for review within the twenty-five day period.54
The WDAF undermined the 2014 election rule in several ways. First, it
would require that no election take place until thirty-five days after a peti-
tion is filed. In addition, it would restore the opportunity to use the threat of
litigation for strategic advantage by automatically postponing any initial
hearing until fourteen days after a petition is filed and by requiring the
hearing officer to take evidence on any issue that “may reasonably be ex-
pected to impact the outcome of the election.”  Thus, even in cases where
there is no need for a hearing, an employer could threaten to further delay
the election by demanding a hearing in order to wrest concessions from the
union regarding the election details or the scope of the bargaining unit. It’s
hard to think of any way in which expanding the opportunities for pre-
election litigation could possibly serve to advance the organizing rights of
workers.
The Employee Privacy Protection Act would require each worker to
tell the employer which form of contact information (telephone number,
email address, or mailing address) the worker wants the employer to share
with the petitioning union.55  In theory, the bill is designed to promote em-
ployee privacy, but if that were the true rationale, then the bill would allow
each worker to decide how many different forms of contact information
they wished to share with a petitioning union. But the bill is so transpar-
ently designed to thwart union organizing rather than to actually promote
worker privacy that it doesn’t even give workers the option of providing
more than one form of contact information.
Labor bills proposed by the Republicans in 2017 are part-and-parcel
with the Republicans’ labor agenda throughout the decade. In 2011, the
House passed the “Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act,”
which would have taken away the power of the NLRB to restore or reinstate
any work, or to rescind any relocation, transfer, subcontracting, or outsourc-
ing, regardless of the circumstances.56 While the impetus for this bill was
the NLRB General Counsel’s decision to issue a complaint against Boeing,
accusing it of relocating work in retaliation for its workers’ union activity,
the bill swept much further, eliminating one of the few meaningful reme-
54. See id. at 74410 (explaining that the Board often did not rule on a request for review
during the twenty-five-day waiting period).
55. H.R. 2775, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing to amend 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) by providing
that any list of eligible voters in an NLRB election would include not more than one form of
personal contact information “such as a telephone number, an email address, or a mailing ad-
dress[ ] chosen by the employee”).
56. H.R. 2587, 112th Cong. (2011).
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dies available under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—one that
had been upheld by a unanimous Supreme Court.57
To understand the impact of this bill, consider the case Healthcare
Emp.’s Union v. NLRB.58 After the technical workers at a hospital filed a
petition seeking a union election, the hospital subcontracted out the entire
respiratory care department.59  The respiratory care employees were the
core of the union’s supporters in the hospital.60  The Ninth Circuit found
that “the inference of anti-union animus raised by the timing of [the] deci-
sion to subcontract [was] ‘stunningly obvious.’”61  The court concluded
that “we would need to ignore a powerful string of coincidences to con-
clude that [the hospital] would have implemented subcontracting, when and
as it did, in the absence of union activity.”62  On remand, the Board ordered
the employer to restore its respiratory care department and reinstate the
twenty-seven employees who lost their jobs as a result of the illegal subcon-
tracting.63  The Republican bill would have barred the Board from ordering
restoration of the respiratory care department, leaving the workers without
any meaningful remedy.
When the Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act was
voted out of committee, then Speaker John Boehner expressed no concern
about depriving workers of a meaningful remedy for illegal conduct by their
employer, but instead said, “I appreciate the committee’s efforts to help get
the government out of the way and to promote a better environment for
private-sector job creation.”64 Representative Mike Kelly of Pennsylvania
declared, “[w]e can’t compete in the global market if government boards
like the NLRB try to dictate what employers can and can’t do, creating a
level of uncertainty that flies in the face of our nation’s free market
principles.”65
What’s remarkable is how much more openly anti-labor the Republi-
cans are now than they were even in the 1990s. In 1995, the major labor bill
passed by the Republican Congress was the Teamwork for Employees and
57. See Fibreboard Paper Prod.’s Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215–16 (1964) (upholding
an NLRB order requiring an employer to restore maintenance operations that had been improperly
subcontracted).
58. 463 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2005).
59. Id. at 920.
60. Id. at 914.
61. Id. at 920 (citing NLRB v. Rubin, 424 F.2d 748, 750 (2d Cir. 1970)).
62. Id. at 924.
63. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 349 N.L.R.B. 365, 367 (2007).
64. Press Release, Educ. & the Workforce Comm., Committee Approves Legislation to Pro-
tect American Jobs, Remove Barriers to U.S. Investment (July 21, 2011), https://web.archive.org/
web/20120916063205/http:/edworkforce.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=253
099.
65. Id.
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Managers Act, known as the TEAM Act.66 The bill would have amended
the section of the NLRA outlawing company unions by authorizing “em-
ployee involvement” programs where managers select workers to meet and
discuss issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, safety, health. While the
TEAM Act might have been a wolf in sheep’s clothing,67 at least the
Republicans felt the need to give the impression that they were addressing a
problem that might be of concern to workers.
COURTS
Even when the Republicans controlled both houses of Congress during
the first two years of Trump’s term, the Senate filibuster prevented them
from enacting the Chamber of Commerce’s wish list of anti-labor legisla-
tion. But the Chamber has been far more successful in the courts. For all his
pro-worker rhetoric, Trump figured out that most working people don’t pay
attention to how judges rule on workplace issues. So, even before the elec-
tion, he floated a list of potential Supreme Court nominees that made clear
his intention to nominate judges who could be counted on to favor manage-
ment on workplace issues.68 Neil Gorsuch was one of the potential nomi-
nees on Trump’s pre-election list, and when Trump followed through by
nominating him to the Court, the AFL-CIO came out strongly against the
nomination.69 In a letter to Senators, AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka
declared, “[a] thorough review of Judge Neil Gorsuch’s record on the U.S.
Court of Appeal for the Tenth Circuit demonstrates that he is far more
likely to rule in favor of corporate interests and against the interests of
66. S. REP. NO. 105-12, at 55 (1997) (amended Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act by striking the semicolon and inserting the following: “Provided further, That it shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to
establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which em-
ployees [who] participate[ ] to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of manage-
ment participate[ ] to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of
quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek
authority to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to negotiate or enter
into collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargain-
ing agreements between the employer and any labor organization, except that in a case in which a
labor organization is the representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a), this proviso
shall not apply;”).
67. To those inside the labor movement, the employee involvement programs authorized by
the TEAM Act recalled company unions used to defeat organizing in the 1920s. See IRVING BERN-
STEIN, THE LEAN YEARS, 170–74 (1960), for a discussion of that history.
68. Trump said that he was taking advice from the Federalist Society and the Heritage Foun-
dation regarding potential Supreme Court nominees. See, e.g., Bob Woodward & Robert Costa, In
a Revealing Interview, Trump Predicts a ‘Massive Recession’ but Intends to Eliminate the Na-
tional Debt in 8 Years, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-
turmoil-or-triumph-donald-trump-stands-alone/2016/04/02/8c0619b6-f8d6-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f
33_story.html?noredirect=on.
69. Richard L. Trumka, Letter to Senators Opposing the Supreme Court Nomination of Neil
Gorsuch, AFL-CIO (Mar. 23, 2017), https://aflcio.org/about/advocacy/legislative-alerts/letter-sena
tors-opposing-supreme-court-nomination-neil-gorsuch.
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working men and women.”70 But, the AFL-CIO’s opposition carried little
weight with the Republican majority in the U.S. Senate.71 And, in his very
first Term on the Supreme Court, Gorsuch provided the decisive vote in two
major labor cases, ruling against workers and unions.
In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, by a five-to-four vote, the Supreme
Court eviscerated the right of workers to band together to engage in collec-
tive legal action.72 In that case, the Court held that an employer may require
employees to waive their right to join with their co-workers to pursue their
legal claims.73 Epic Systems was the culmination of a multi-year project by
employers to channel employment disputes into private arbitration
proceedings.
One of the early steps in this project was the Court’s holding in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. that a claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act may be subject to compulsory arbitration.74 The arbitra-
tion clause was contained in Gilmer’s securities registration application
with the New York Stock Exchange, so the case left open the question of
whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to employment con-
tracts.75  This should never have been a question in the first place because
the FAA provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”76 But, then in 2001, in a five-
to-four decision, the Supreme Court held in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ad-
ams that only contracts of employment of transportation workers are ex-
70. Id.
71. The AFL-CIO also opposed Trump’s nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the Court, but
there is no evidence that any Republican Senators feared that a vote for Kavanaugh would harm
them politically. To the contrary, many political observers thought that some Democratic Senators
were hurt by their votes against Kavanaugh. See, e.g., Michael Barone, Opinion, Michael Barone:
The Kavanaugh Effect was Senate Democrats’ Undoing, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 8, 2019, 10:31
AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/michael-barone-the-kavanaugh-effect-was-
senate-democrats-undoing; Christal Hayes & William Cummings, Democratic Senators Lost in
Battleground States After Voting Against Kavanaugh, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2018, 6:28 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/07/kavanaugh-effect-midterm-
elections/1915457002; Kevin Breuninger, Republicans Credit the ‘Kavanaugh Effect’ for Senate
Wins Against Red-state Democrats, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/
11/07/gop-credits-kavanaugh-effect-for-senate-wins-against-red-state-democrats.html; Jessica
Kwong, Brett Kavanaugh Could Rescue Donald Trump, Republicans in Midterm Elections, Polls
Suggest, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/brett-kavanaugh-don
ald-trump-republicans-midterm-1153344; Press Release, AFL-CIO, Judge Brett Kavanaugh Puts
Rights of Working People at Serious Risk (July 9, 2018), https://aflcio.org/press/releases/judge-
brett-kavanaugh-puts-rights-working-people-serious-risk.
72. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
73. Id. at 1619.
74. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
75. Id. at 25 n.2.
76. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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empted from the FAA’s coverage.77 The legislative history showed that the
FAA was never intended to cover any employment contracts, but the
Court’s majority declared there was no need to assess the legislative his-
tory.78 This led Justice Stevens to observe that “[a] method of statutory
interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained,
may produce a result that is consistent with a court’s own views of how
things should be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for which a provi-
sion was enacted. That is the sad result in this case.”79
After the Circuit City decision, more and more employers began to
require employees to submit all disputes to arbitration.80 In Epic Systems,
Justice Gorsuch began the majority opinion with the question, “Should em-
ployees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them
will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration?”81 In her dissent, Justice
Ginsburg pointed out that these were not agreements that were subject to
negotiation.82 Instead, two of the three employers in the case, Epic Systems
and Ernst & Young, emailed the arbitration agreements to employees and
informed the employees that by continuing to show up at work, they would
be accepting the terms of the agreements.83
From the time the NLRA became law, the Board and the courts held
that when workers join together to file a lawsuit, the workers are exercising
their rights under Section 7 of the Act to engage in “concerted activities for
. . . mutual aid or protection.”84 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it
unlawful for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this article.”85 Epic
Systems should have been an easy case. If an employer e-mailed workers
telling them that by continuing to work, they were agreeing to waive their
right to strike, the resulting “agreement” would clearly be unenforceable.86
77. 532 U.S. 105 (2001); See Andrew Strom, If the Supreme Court is Going to Start Over-
turning Precedent. . ., ONLABOR (Feb. 5, 2016), https://onlabor.org/if-the-supreme-court-is-going-
to-start-overturning-precedent/ (discussing Circuit City in greater length).
78. See Circuit City, 523 U.S. at 119 (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the
text of § 1, we need not assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision.” (citing Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–148 (1994)).
79. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), epi.org/144131 (describing a study conducted by the Economic Policy Insti-
tute in 2017 and 2018 finding that the share of workers subjected to mandatory arbitration had
risen from just over two percent in 1992 to over fifty-five percent).
81. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
82. Id. at 1636 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the “employees . . . faced a
Hobson’s choice: accept arbitration on their employer’s terms or give up their jobs.”).
83. Id. (“Ernst & Young similarly e-mailed its employees an arbitration agreement, which
stated that the employees’ continued employment would indicate their assent to the agreement’s
terms.”).
84. Id. at 1637–38.
85. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) (1974).
86. Mandel Security Bureau, 202 N.L.R.B. 117, 119 (1973) (finding that employer’s condi-
tioning of reinstatement on employee’s forbearance from future concerted activities was unlaw-
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Shortly after the NLRA was enacted, the Supreme Court asserted that
“[o]bviously employers cannot set at naught the National Labor Relations
Act by inducing their workmen to agree not to demand performance of the
duties which it imposes. . . .”87 Following this logic, it should have been
clear that an employer may not insist that its employees prospectively waive
their right to engage in collective legal action. Yet, the five-Justice majority
described the NLRA as a mere “mousehole,”88 that was easily subordinate
to the Federal Arbitration Act.
It is hard to view Epic Systems as anything more than a case where the
majority worked backward from their preferred result. One explanation for
how the majority was able to justify the result is that the Justices and their
clerks have very little familiarity with the NLRA. Prior to the 1970s, cases
involving the interpretation of the NLRA were a regular part of the Su-
preme Court’s docket. But now the Court rarely hears cases involving the
interpretation of the Act.89 A study published in 1999 found that judges
who had experience representing management before the NLRB were
“more than twice as likely as a judge without that experience to reverse a
pro-employer. . .” NLRB decision.90 The authors of that study theorized
that “familiarity with the [NLRA] breeds greater respect for its protective
doctrinal scope—even if the familiarity is developed while representing
employer interests.”91 The Justices lack of familiarity with the NLRA was
illustrated by the majority’s assertion that the Act sets up a “careful regime”
providing “specific guidance” about the obligation to bargain collectively
and other matters covered by the Act.92 The majority claimed that “it is
hard to fathom why Congress would take such care to regulate all the other
matters mentioned in Section 7 yet remain mute about this matter alone—
unless, of course, Section 7 doesn’t speak to class and collective action
procedures in the first place.”93 But, anyone with passing familiarity with
the NLRA would know that this description of the Act is simply untrue.94
ful); See Ishikawa Gasket Am., Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. 175, 175–76 (2001) (finding that separation
agreement between employer and employee was unlawful where it, inter alia, required employee
not to “influence, or otherwise direct any employee of the Company to . . . engage in any dispute
or work disruption with the Company” for twelve months).
87. Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940).
88. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626–27 (2018).
89. Before Epic Systems, the last time the Court decided a case involving the scope of the
NLRA’s protections was in 2001. See NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. 706
(2001).
90. James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675,
1720 (1999).
91. Id. at 1745.
92. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625.
93. Id. at 1625–26.
94. I don’t know to what extent the different Justices delegate work to their law clerks, but
only a small fraction of law students currently take a traditional labor law class. Yale Law School,
one of the top feeder schools for the Court, is not even offering a traditional labor law class in
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-JAN-20 11:56
32 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1
The Act itself is written in broad terms—it gives workers the right to en-
gage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection,”95 and it makes it illegal for employers “to
interfere with restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of those
rights.”96  But the Act provides little or no “specific guidance” about any
issue, and as a result, the scope of the protections afforded by the NLRA
has been developed through case law. For instance, Congress provided that
employers must “meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith,” but it
provides no further details about an employer’s bargaining obligation.97
Thus, the NLRB and the courts have had to establish that in certain circum-
stances the obligation to bargain imposes on an employer the obligation to
provide information to the union.98 A brief review of the U.S. Reports
would have demonstrated that again and again, the Court has been called
upon to address the scope of Section 7 protections precisely because Con-
gress has not provided specific guidance.99
While the decision in Epic Systems narrowed the scope of the protec-
tions afforded by the NLRA, it did not directly weaken unions. But, shortly
after the Court announced its decision in Epic Systems, it leveled a direct
attack on unions in Janus v. American Federation of State, City, & Munici-
pal Employees, Council 31.100 Like Epic Systems, Janus was the culmina-
tion of a multi-year project. The Court in Janus addressed whether state law
may require public employees who are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement to pay a fee to the union for the cost of bargaining the contract
and representing workers under the contract.
In 1977, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,101 the Court held that
public employees may be compelled to financially support their collective
bargaining representative as long as the fees only cover matters germane to
2018-19. See YLS:COURSES, https://courses.law.yale.edu/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). Thus, the
clerks for the dissenting Justices in Epic Systems would have been unlikely to realize the full
extent of this glaring mistake.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2017).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1974).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1974).
98. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (affirming Board’s ruling
that an employer did not bargain in good faith where it refused to provide information substantiat-
ing a claim that it was unable to pay higher wages).
99. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962) (finding that Section 7
protects the right to strike even where the workers do not make a specific demand on the em-
ployer, and further finding that employers may not require employees to seek permission from a
foreman before engaging in a collective walkout); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564
(1978) (finding that workers had a right under Section 7 to distribute newsletter at the workplace
criticizing a presidential veto of a bill to raise the minimum wage). See, e.g., Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (finding that Section 7 protects the right to distribute
union literature and wear union insignia at the workplace).
100. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2456
(2018).
101. 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977).
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bargaining and representation. The Court in Abood recognized that the prin-
ciple of exclusive representation is a central element in labor relations in
this country. Instead of having multiple groups each competing to speak for
the same workforce, the group selected by the majority must speak for all
workers in a bargaining unit. This requirement to act on behalf of the entire
workforce-imposed costs on the union, and it also imposed an obligation to
represent all workers fairly and equitably, whether or not workers chose to
belong to the union. The requirement that nonmembers pay a fair-share fee
is a means of assuring that nonmembers do not gain the benefits of union
representation without sharing some of the costs of providing that represen-
tation.102 The Court recognized in Abood that compelling employees to fi-
nancially support their collective bargaining representative could be
considered an “impingement” on their First Amendment rights, but it is
justified by the important government interests in supporting a model of
labor relations based on exclusive representation.103 In Abood, the Court
also held that unions could not use mandatory fees to express political
views or support ideological causes that were not germane to collective
bargaining.104
Abood was decided at a time when one-fourth of all workers in this
country belonged to unions.105 This meant that even individuals who did
not belong to unions likely had friends and family members who were
union members. Thus, the concept of exclusive representation and the dan-
gers of free-riding were familiar to the public. After Abood, over the next
thirty-five years, the Court decided a series of cases addressing the line
between germane and non-germane expenses, but it did not question the
basic framework.106
Then, in 2012, in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Lo-
cal 1000, the Court addressed whether a union had given nonmembers an
adequate opportunity to object to a special temporary increase in fees to
fund opposition to two ballot propositions.107 As Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg noted in their concurring opinion, the case could have been de-
cided with a short opinion stating that unions must provide a new notice and
opportunity to object whenever they levy a special assessment or dues in-
crease to fund political activities.108 But, Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
102. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n., 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting) (“Where the state imposes upon the union a duty to deliver services, it may permit the
union to demand reimbursement for them; or, looked at from the other end, where the state creates
in the nonmembers a legal entitlement from the union, it may compel them to pay the cost”).
103. Abood, 431 U.S. at 225.
104. Id. at 235–36.
105. See Hirsch, supra note 13.
106. As recently as 2009, in Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 220 (2009), the Supreme Court
unanimously applied Abood to hold that certain litigation expenses were chargeable to
nonmembers.
107. 567 U.S. 298, 321 (2012).
108. Id. at 305 (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
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Kennedy, and Thomas took the opportunity to call into question the very
legitimacy of Abood. They described the holding in Abood as an “anom-
aly,” and they asserted that concerns about free-riding are “generally insuf-
ficient to overcome First Amendment objections.”109 Showing a lack of
understanding about the obligations imposed on a union acting as an exclu-
sive bargaining representative, the majority offered the analogy of a parent-
teacher association raising money for the school library.110 Of course, a
parent-teacher association is free to direct money only to causes supported
by those who contribute funds, and it has no obligation to pursue the griev-
ances of parents who choose not to contribute. After Knox, anti-union advo-
cacy groups began looking for a test case to ask the Supreme Court to
overturn Abood.
Harris v. Quinn seemed to provide that opportunity.111 Harris in-
volved a challenge to fair share fees for personal assistants who were paid
by the State of Illinois to provide in-home support services for individuals
who could not otherwise live on their own due to age, illness, or injury.112
The petitioners in Harris argued that the Court should overturn Abood.113
The majority in Harris came close to accepting the invitation, declaring the
Court’s analysis in Abood “questionable on several grounds.”114 Neverthe-
less, the Court left Abood standing. Instead, the majority declared that be-
cause the personal assistants were not full-fledged public employees, but
rather, at minimum, jointly employed by their customers, the Court was
unwilling to “extend Abood to the new situation.”115
In 2015, the Court heard Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n. and
appeared ready to overturn Abood. But before the Court had a chance to
issue its opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia died suddenly, and then the Court
deadlocked four–four.116 When the Senate confirmed Gorsuch to replace
Scalia, it seemed inevitable that the Court would finally overrule Abood.
But, while the decision in Janus surprised nobody, the case demonstrates
how the Court’s conservatives are willing to disregard originalism when it
becomes inconvenient.117 Justice Thomas often receives attention for his
109. Id. at 311.
110. Id.
111. Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 617 (2014).
112. Id. at 623.
113. Brief of Petitioners at 16, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/11-681_
pet.authcheckdam.pdf.
114. Harris, 573 U.S. at 635.
115. Id. at 645.
116. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (affirming judgment by an
equally divided Court).
117. I have addressed this issue before in Andrew Strom, In Janus, the Court’s ‘Originalists’
Show Their True Colors, ONLABOR (June 29, 2018), https://onlabor.org/in-janus-the-courts-
originalists-show-their-true-colors/ and Andrew Strom, Will Justice Thomas Bring His Brand of
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commitment to originalism.118  As part of a collection of essays in the Yale
Law Journal commemorating Thomas’s first twenty-five years on the
Court, Judge William Pryor wrote that Thomas had “advanced originalism
as a respected methodology.”119 When Justice Thomas’s politics do not get
in the way, he is willing to stake out positions that call for overturning long-
settled doctrines if those doctrines are at odds with his understanding of the
original meaning of the Constitution.120 In 2007, in Morse v. Frederick,121 a
case involving the free speech rights of high school students, Justice
Thomas wrote separately to argue that “the First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.”122 He
reached this conclusion based on his observation that “[i]f students in public
schools were originally understood as having free-speech rights, one would
have expected nineteenth century public schools to have respected those
rights and courts to have enforced them. They did not.”123 But, the same
could be said regarding the free speech rights of public employees. In an
1892 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision, the future U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that a policeman “may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman.”124 In 1983, the Supreme Court asserted that “[f]or most
of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no
right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—includ-
ing those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”125
The majority opinion in Janus was utterly dismissive of any originalist
argument. Notably, the majority started its discussion of the issue with the
observation that “we doubt that the Union—or its members—actually want
us to hold that public employees have no free speech rights.”126 Whether or
not this is true, it ought to be irrelevant. If the original meaning of the
Originalism to Friedrichs?, ONLABOR (Dec. 10, 2015), https://onlabor.org/will-justice-thomas-
bring-his-brand-of-originalism-to-friedrichs/.
118. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Unexpected Importance of Clarence Thomas, POLITICO
(Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/supreme-court-2016-clarence-
thomas-legacy-214319 (asserting that both Thomas and Scalia shared a commitment to original-
ism, “[b]ut Scalia was more willing than Thomas to temper his originalism with respect for estab-
lished precedent.”).
119. William H. Pryor Jr., Justice Thomas, Criminal Justice, and Originalism’s Legitimacy,
127 YALE L.J.F. (COLLECTION) 173 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-thomas-
criminal-justice-and-originalisms-legitimacy.
120. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would discard the Court’s negative Commerce
Clause jurisprudence”).
121. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007).
122. Id. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 411.
124. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
125. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
126. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2469
(2018).
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Constitution controls, it should control regardless of the party making the
argument, and regardless of whether that party might be expected to make a
different argument in other circumstances.127 The methodology the Court
utilized in Janus was in sharp contrast to Justice Thomas’s approach in
Morse. Whereas in Morse, Justice Thomas focused on the absence of early
cases enforcing the free speech rights of students, in Janus, the majority
placed the burden on AFSCME to show sufficient examples of early laws
restricting the speech of public employees.128 Although AFSCME had
pointed to founding-era laws barring government employees from election-
eering and prohibiting military personnel from using disrespectful words
against the President or Congress, the Court majority deemed these insuffi-
cient without pointing to any affirmative evidence that public employees
were considered to have free speech rights during the founding era.129 In
light of the short-shrift given to originalism in Janus, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists were happy with the
result reached by Justice Alito’s majority opinion and saw no need to jeop-
ardize that outcome.
Epic Systems and Janus were two huge gifts to the Chamber of Com-
merce and its allies. Epic Systems gives large corporations the green light to
channel all workplace litigation into individual cases that happen behind
closed doors. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, the “inevitable
result” of the decision will be the underenforcement of worker protection
statutes because “[e]xpenses entailed in mounting individual claims will
often far outweigh potential recoveries.”130 And, while the full impact of
Janus is yet to be seen, one study conducted before the decision anticipated
that the decision would reduce union membership among state and local
government employees by 8.2 percent and would drive down wages for
public sector workers.131 As usual, Donald Trump wasn’t shy about what he
hoped would be the effect of the decision. On the day the Court issued its
127. For instance, if a conservative “law-and-order” politician were a criminal defendant in a
case before a court, one would expect the court to address any constitutional issues on the merits
without any snide commentary about the politician’s hypocrisy.
128. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2470 (“The Union offers no persuasive founding-era evidence
that public employees were understood to lack free speech protections.”).
129. Id. (“The only early speech restrictions the Union identifies are an 1806 statute prohibit-
ing military personnel from using ‘contemptuous or disrespectful words against the President’ and
other officials, and an 1801 directive limiting electioneering by top government employees. [cite
om.] But those examples at most show that the government was understood to have power to limit
employee speech that threatened important governmental interests (such as maintaining military
discipline and preventing corruption)—not that public employees’ speech was entirely unpro-
tected.”). Notably, the Court did not address the assertion in AFSCME’s brief that “[w]ith the first
presidential administration change, the government removed public employees based on their po-
litical speech.” Brief for Respondent at 3, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466).
130. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1646–47 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. FRANK MANZO AND ROBERT BRUNO, ILL. ECON. POLICY INST., After Janus: The Impend-
ing Effects on Public Sector Workers from a Decision Against Fair Share 4 (2018), https://illinois
epi.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/ilepi-pmcr-after-janus-final.pdf.
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decision, he tweeted “Big loss for the coffers of the Democrats.”132  The
expectation was that weakened unions would have less money to spend on
politics, further entrenching the power of the corporate interests.
THE NLRB
In response to an outburst by President Trump, Chief Justice Roberts
recently declared, “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush
judges or Clinton judges.”133 By contrast, when it comes to the NLRB,
observers have long referred to the “Reagan Board,” or the “Clinton
Board,” or the “Bush Board.”134 This is by design because, unlike judges
who have life tenure, Board Members are members of the executive branch
who serve staggered five-year terms, and each President eventually gets to
appoint a new majority. While the D.C. Circuit once observed that “[i]t is a
fact of life in NLRB lore that certain substantive provisions of the NLRA
invariably fluctuate with the changing composition of the Board,”135 there
are actually surprisingly few examples of this type of fluctuation.136
Board law has remained relatively stable over the years because proce-
dural norms have limited the ability of Board Members to overturn deci-
sions they disagree with. For instance, Board Members may apply a
precedent they have doubts about where no party has asked that it be over-
turned.137 Or a party fearing an adverse decision may settle a case before
the Board has a chance to decide the issue.138 In September 2007, the Bush
132. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2018, 7:11 AM), https://twitter
.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1011975204778729474.
133. William Cummings, US Does Have ‘Obama judges’: Trump Responds to Supreme Court
Justice John Roberts Rebuke, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2018/11/21/john-roberts-trump-statement/2080266002/.
134. See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recogni-
tion, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 219 (2010).
135. Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
136. While it is not unusual for the Board to overrule an earlier decision, it is rare for the
Board to go back and forth repeatedly. One example where the Board reversed itself multiple
times involved the extent to which it would police misrepresentations by employers and unions
during election campaigns. The Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics, 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962)
in Shopping Kart Food Mkt., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), and then reversed itself again in General
Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), and once more in Midland Life Insurance Co.,
263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). But the Board has not revisited this question since 1982.
137. See, e.g., St. George Warehouse, 355 N.L.R.B. 474 n.3 (2010) (“Member Becker notes
that no exceptions were filed to the judge’s application of the job search requirements set forth in
Grosvenor Resort, 350 NLRB 1197 (2007)”); U-Haul Co. of Nev., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 195,196 n.4
(2004) (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber suggest that “it may be prudent” for the Board
to prohibit election observers from wearing campaign insignia, but “as no party expressly seeks to
overrule extant Board precedent, they apply that precedent here.”).
138. For example, on September 11, 2018, the Board announced that it was inviting amicus
briefs in a case, Loshaw Thermal Technology, LLC, Case 05-CA-158650, on whether it should
reconsider its holding in Staunton Fuel & Material, 335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001). Board Invites Briefs
Regarding Whether Section 9(a) Bargaining Relationships in the Construction Industry May Be
Established by Contract Language Alone, NLRB (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-
outreach/news-story/board-invites-briefs-regarding-whether-section-9a-bargaining-relationships.
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NLRB issued sixty-one decisions that collectively came to be known inside
the labor movement as the “September Massacre.”139 While the labor
movement was eager to overturn those decisions, many of them are still on
the books today.
During a single week in December 2017, the new Trump Board sent
notice that it had no intention of adhering to those longstanding procedural
norms; instead, it issued three decisions overturning precedent even though
no party had challenged the existing precedent.140 PCC Structurals, Inc.,141
a fourth decision issued that week, is notable because it represents the cul-
mination of a multi-year campaign by the Chamber of Commerce and its
allies to overturn the Board’s 2011 decision in Specialty Healthcare & Re-
habilitation Center of Mobile.142
The attack on Specialty Healthcare illustrates how the business lobby
and its Republican allies have been willing to aggressively challenge any
measure that makes it even the slightest bit easier for workers to organize.
In Specialty Healthcare, the Board attempted to rationalize an area of labor
law that had previously been a source of confusion.143 The NLRA provides
that workers may organize in an “appropriate” unit, but it does not define
what makes a particular bargaining unit “appropriate.”144 The Board
adopted a rule to define appropriate bargaining units in acute care hospitals,
After that, the union in Loshaw asked to withdraw its charge, and the Board granted the request
and rescinded the amicus invitation. Board Rescinds Invitation to File Briefs in Loshaw Thermal
Technology, NLRB (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-re
scinds-invitation-file-briefs-loshaw-thermal-technology.
139. Lofaso, supra note 134, at 201–02.
140. In UPMC, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 153 (Dec. 11, 2017), the Board overturned U.S. Postal
Serv., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (Aug. 27, 2016) even though, as Board Member Pearce pointed out
in his dissent, “[n]one of the parties has asked the Board to overrule Postal Service. . . .” In Boeing
Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (Dec. 14, 2017), the Board overruled Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004), even though, as Board Member McFerran pointed out “[n]o
party and no participant in this case . . . has asked the Board to overrule Lutheran Heritage.”
Flouting an additional procedural norm, the only rule at issue in Boeing was a rule prohibiting
employee photography, but the Board used the case to overturn precedent regarding rules promot-
ing civility at the workplace. Finally, in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No.
156 (Dec. 14, 2017), the Board overruled Browning-Ferris Industries of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015), even though no party had asked it to reconsider Browning-Ferris. The
Board later vacated the decision in Hy-Brand based on a determination by the agency’s Ethics
Official that Board Member Emanuel should have been disqualified from participating in the
proceeding. See Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 366 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Feb. 26, 2018).
141. 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017).
142. 357 N.L.R.B. 934 (2011), enforced sub nom. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC v. NLRB,
727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013).
143. Id. at 944 (“We acknowledge that the Board has sometimes used different words to de-
scribe this standard and has sometimes decided cases such as this without articulating any clear
standard.”).
144. See 29 U.S.C. §159(b) (2012) (“The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof . . .”).
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but it has not defined appropriate units in other settings.145 The result has
been that when a particular group of workers seek union representation,
their employer is free to challenge the proposed bargaining unit on the
grounds that it ought to also include an additional group of workers.146
When employers challenge the proposed bargaining unit, they are generally
focused on “winning” the election, rather than on some abstract notion of an
ideal unit for collective bargaining.147  So, employers will often argue for
the inclusion of a group of anti-union workers in the bargaining unit.148
For any given employer, there may be multiple appropriate bargaining
units,149 and as long as a union petitions for an election in an appropriate
unit, the Board will not deny the petition on the grounds that another unit
would be more appropriate.150 But, before Specialty Healthcare, the Board
had not announced a clear standard for the test it would use when an em-
ployer insisted that a proposed bargaining unit must also include an addi-
tional group of workers.151 In one case, the Board asked “whether the
interests of the group sought are sufficiently distinct from those of other
employees.”152 In another case, the Board rejected a proposed unit because
it “excludes employees who share a substantial community of interest with
the employees in the unit sought.”153 In other cases, the Board stated the
test as “whether the community of interest they share . . . is so strong that it
requires or mandates their inclusion in the unit.”154 There were also several
145. 29 C.F.R. §103.30 (2012). In acute care hospitals, the Board has established eight sepa-
rate appropriate units. As an example, one of these units consists of all registered nurses. Thus,
when the registered nurses at a hospital seek to organize, the Board does not need to decide
whether the unit also needs to include other professional employees, such as pharmacists. But, in
other settings, the Board makes a case-by-case determination as to whether a particular group of
workers shares a “community of interest.” NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985).
146. See Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. at 943 (explaining that
question presented is what showing is required to demonstrate that a proposed unit is not appropri-
ate because the smallest appropriate unit contains additional employees).
147. When the Board conducts a representation election, the question is whether workers want
union representation. The employer is not on the ballot, but colloquially people often talk about
the employer winning the election when workers vote against representation.
148. See Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74308, 74393 n.398 (Dec. 14, 2015)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101, 102, 103) (referring to a union comment that negotiations over
unit inclusion issues before an election involve “maneuvering to exclude or include particular
workers to skew the election results.”).
149. See Country Ford Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[M]ore
than one appropriate bargaining unit logically can be defined in any particular factual setting.”
(quoting Local 627, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir.
1979))).
150. See P.J. Dick Contracting, 290 N.L.R.B. 150, 151 (1988) (“Board inquiry pursues not the
most appropriate or comprehensive unit but simply an appropriate unit.”).
151. Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. at 944.
152. Wheeling Island Gaming, 355 N.L.R.B. 637, 637 n.2 (2010) (quoting Newton-Wellesley
Hospital, 250 N.L.R.B. 409, 411–412 (1980)).
153. Colorado National Bank of Denver, 204 N.L.R.B. 243 (1973).
154. Engineered Storage Prods Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 1063 (2001); Accord J.C. Penney Co., 328
N.L.R.B. 766, 766 (1999).
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other formulations the Board used when confronting this question, but all
pointed to some heightened showing in order for the Board to find that an
otherwise appropriate unit is inappropriate because it does not also include
an additional group of employees.
In Specialty Healthcare, the Board decided that the time had come to
announce a clearer test to replace all these varying verbal formulations. The
test the Board adopted was used by a unanimous D.C. Circuit panel that
happened to include three judges appointed by Republican Presidents.155
Under this test, if a petitioning union proposes a unit consisting of employ-
ees readily identifiable as a group who share a community of interest, an
employer proposing a larger unit “must demonstrate that employees in the
more encompassing unit share an overwhelming community of interest such
that there is no legitimate basis upon which to exclude certain employees
from it.”156
As soon as Specialty Healthcare was announced, the business lobby
started shouting that the sky was falling.157 Someone cleverly coined the
term “micro-units” to describe the bargaining units that would result from
the decision, even though the median size of bargaining units remained un-
changed after Specialty Healthcare.158 Republican members of Congress
denounced the decision and introduced legislation to overturn it.159 Em-
ployers also aggressively challenged the decision in the circuit courts,
bringing cases in eight different circuits. Each circuit to consider the issue
upheld Specialty Healthcare.160 The Sixth Circuit was the first to consider
155. See Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (The judges ap-
pointed were Ginsburg, Brown, and Griffith).
156. Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. at 944.
157. See e.g., Jason Klindt, Micro-unions a problem for small businesses, SOUTHEAST MIS-
SOURIAN (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.semissourian.com/story/1893453.html. The author of this
piece is identified as the director of the Coalition to Protect Missouri Jobs. The website of that
organization states that the Coalition is a project of the Workplace Fairness Institute, which is
“funded by and advocates on behalf of business owners who enjoy good working relationships
with their employees and would like to maintain those good relationships without the unfair inter-
ference of government bureaucrats, union organizers, and special interests.” See About Us, COALI-
TION TO PROTECT MISSOURI JOBS, http://www.protectmojobs.com/content.aspa?page=about (last
visited Sept. 7, 2019).
158. The median size of bargaining units was twenty-four in Fiscal Year 2009 and twenty-
seven in Fiscal Year 2010. In the years since then, the median size has fluctuated between twenty-
four and twenty-eight. See Median Size of Bargaining Units in Elections, NLRB, https://www.nlrb
.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-elections/median-size-bargaining-units-elections
(last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
159. I described some of this Republican overreaction in Andrew Strom, When Will the
Republicans in Congress Stop Crying Wolf?, ON LABOR (June 10, 2016), https://onlabor.org/
when-will-the-republicans-in-congress-stop-crying-wolf.
160. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013); FedEx Freight,
Inc. v. NLRB, 816 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2016); Nestle Dreyer’s Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 821 F.3d
489 (4th Cir. 2016); Macy’s, Inc. v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 557 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
2265 (2017); NLRB v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2016); FedEx Freight, Inc. v.
NLRB, 839 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2016); Constellation Brands, U.S. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 842
F.3d 784 (2d Cir. 2016); and Rhino Nw., LLC v. NLRB, 867 F.3d 95 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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the issue. In response to the employer’s argument that “this overwhelming
community-of-interest standard represents a ‘material change in the law,’”
the court responded, “this is just not so.”161 Instead, the Sixth Circuit found
that the new test simply represented a clarification of the standard.162 The
Eighth Circuit similarly found that Specialty Healthcare was “not a material
departure from past precedent,”163 and the D.C. Circuit likewise concluded
that “the Board in Specialty Healthcare simply took a fitting opportunity to
make clear the exact language it would employ going forward and . . . its
formulation was drawn from Board precedent.”164
Once Trump was elected, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the
Board would overturn Specialty Healthcare, simply because the business
lobby had invested so much energy into ranting about it. When Trump took
office there were two vacancies on the Board. Trump nominated Marvin
Kaplan, who had spent most of his short career as a Republican staffer in
the House,165 and William Emanuel, who had spent his career at a law firm
representing employers.166 Just three months after Emanuel took office, the
Board decided PCC Structurals, Inc. The employer in PCC Structurals, Inc.
manufactured steel, superalloy, and titanium castings for use in aircraft and
other industrial purposes.167 The Machinists Union had petitioned to re-
present a unit of approximately 100 welders, but the employer insisted that
the smallest appropriate unit would consist of all of its approximately 2,500
production and maintenance employees.168 If the Trump Board was not
chomping at the bit to overturn Specialty Healthcare, it could have decided
the case on much narrower grounds. As Members McFerran and Pearce
pointed out in dissent, “welders-only units in this exact industry have been
approved by the Board in the past.”169
Despite the findings of the circuit courts, the majority rejected as “im-
plausible” the notion that Specialty Healthcare was merely “restating and
clarifying the Board’s traditional test.”170 The majority further declared that
161. Kindred Nursing, 727 F.3d at 561.
162. Id.
163. FedEx Freight, Inc., 816 F.3d at 525.
164. Rhino Nw., LLC, 867 F.3d at 100.
165. See Statement of Marvin Kaplan Nominee for Member, National Labor Relations Board
Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the United States Senate,
HELP.SENATE.GOV (July 13, 2017), https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kaplan1.pdf.
166. See Statement of William J. Emanuel Nominee for Member of the National Relations
Board Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the United States
Senate, HELP.SENATE.GOV (July 13, 2017), https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Emanuel
.pdf.
167. 365 N.L.R.B. No. 160, at 1 (Dec. 15, 2017).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 14 n.1 (citing Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966)). In fact,
after remanding the case to the Regional Director, the Board ultimately issued an unpublished
Order finding that the Union’s proposed unit was appropriate. See PCC Structurals, Inc., Case
No.19-RC-202188 (Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. Nov. 28, 2018).
170. PCC Structurals, Inc., Case No.19-RC-202188, at 7.
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it “respectfully disagree[d]” with the assessment of the eight circuit courts
that Specialty Healthcare represented a permissible construction of the
Act.171 The Trump majority announced a new test that gives no deference
to the petitioned-for unit, and  instead asks “whether the petitioned-for em-
ployees share a community of interest sufficiently distinct from employees
excluded from the proposed unit to warrant a separate appropriate unit.”172
Of course, as the Board explained in Specialty Healthcare, this language
“leaves open the question of what degree of difference renders the groups’
interests ‘sufficiently distinct.’”173
The PCC Structurals, Inc. majority does not even attempt to provide
guidance as to how to define “sufficiently distinct.” The majority insists
that “nothing in today’s decision provides for the Board to reject an appro-
priate petitioned-for bargaining unit on the basis that a larger unit is more
appropriate.”174 But, elsewhere, it criticizes the Board for applying Spe-
cialty Healthcare to approve a bargaining unit consisting of a single depart-
ment in a retail store because the Board had previously declared a storewide
unit to be “the optimum unit for the purposes of collective bargaining” in
the retail industry.175 The Board stated that under the new test it will con-
sider the Section 7 rights of employees who are excluded from the proposed
bargaining unit, but it does not explain how.176 Taking the Board at its
word, it would not be enough to say that including the additional workers
would create a “more appropriate” unit, but the Board provides no further
explanation as to the circumstances when excluded employees must be ad-
ded to the unit.
In a less polarized era, employers would have conceded that Specialty
Healthcare represented a reasonable attempt to clarify a confusing standard.
But, under our current system, an ambiguous standard works to the advan-
tage of employers. As the dissenters pointed out, “[t]he more subjective the
standard is, the greater the opportunity to litigate the appropriateness of the
unit, and consequently, the greater the opportunity to delay and frustrate
employees’ right to organize.”177 The threat of this litigation and delay will
be a bargaining chip that employers can deploy when workers file for an
election.178 In order to avoid protracted litigation over the scope of the bar-
171. Id. at 11 n.44.
172. Id. at 7.
173. Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. 934, 945 (2011).
174. PCC Structurals, Inc., Case No.19-RC-202188, at 12.
175. Id. at 10 n.36.
176. Id. at 8 (“Henceforth, the Board’s determination of unit appropriateness will consider the
Section 7 rights of employees excluded from the proposed unit and those included in that unit,
regardless of whether there are ‘overwhelming’ interests between the two groups.”).
177. PCC Structurals, Inc., Case No.19-RC-202188, at 24 (Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. Dec. 15,
2017).
178. See Representation—Case Procedures 79 Fed. Reg. 74308, 74387 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101, 102, 103), where the Board observed in its 2014 rulemaking that
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gaining unit, the union would likely need to make concessions either about
the bargaining unit, or perhaps about another contested issue.
PCC Structurals, Inc. illustrates how the apparatus created as a result
of the Powell Memo, combined with the weakened political power of the
labor movement, serves to keep moving the legal terrain in a direction that
makes it harder for workers to organize. As recently as 2008, three very
conservative D.C. Circuit judges179 embraced the “overwhelming commu-
nity of interest” test to determine when a proposed bargaining unit must
also include an additional group of workers.180 But, now Republicans in
Congress describe that same standard as “job-crushing,”181 and the Republi-
can appointees on the Board will not even concede that it represents a per-
missible construction of the Act.182
CONCLUSION
To return to the quote from Harry Johnson, we are fast reaching a
point where we should ask, “Are we still America?” In 1932, Congress
recognized that, given the rise of large corporations, “the individual unor-
ganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms
and conditions of employment.”183 That statement is just as true today as it
was then. And, if the United States has any chance of living up to its best
ideals, then we need to enact and enforce policies that make it easier for
workers to organize. Yet, there is no clear road map to reach a place where
that will happen. The business lobby may even be too powerful for its own
good, but it is certainly too powerful for the good of the country.
employers often use this opportunity for litigation to extract concessions from unions regarding
the election details.
179. Douglas Ginsburg (nominated by Ronald Reagan to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court);
Thomas Griffith (gave a lecture in 2015 entitled Who’s the Activist Now? What It Means to Be a
Conservative Judge, (Mar. 5, 2015)); Janice Rogers Brown (advocated for overturning New Deal
era decisions, such as Nebbia v. New York, that allow state and local jurisdictions to “adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare,” Hettinga v.
United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 516 (1934)).
180. See Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
181. See The National Labor Relations Board Starting Off on the Right Foot in 2018, COMM.
ON EDUC. & LAB. REPUBLICANS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aasp?DocumentID=402372.
182. See PCC Structurals, Inc., Case No.19-RC-202188, at 24 (Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. Dec.
15, 2017).
183. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2017).
